Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
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Publication:1252142
DOI10.1007/BF00126341zbMath0393.90005MaRDI QIDQ1252142
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures ⋮ Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
Cites Work
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- Positionalist voting functions
- The independence condition in the theory of social choice
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Democratic preference functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Realization of Choice Functions
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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