A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and Shapley models in N-person quota games with one weak player

DOI10.1007/BF00133086zbMath0395.90096OpenAlexW2030701810MaRDI QIDQ1253190

Abraham D. Horowitz

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133086

zbMATH Keywords

Game TheoryBehavioral Experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Cites Work

• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
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