Asymptotic stability and other properties of trajectories and transfer sequences leading to the bargaining sets

DOI10.1007/BF01769267zbMath0395.90100OpenAlexW2004110622MaRDI QIDQ1253192

Michael Maschler, Gil Kalai, Guillermo Owen

Publication date: 1975

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769267

zbMATH Keywords

Asymptotic StabilityBargaining SetsN-Person Cooperative Game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Discrete-time control/observation systems (93C55) Lyapunov and other classical stabilities (Lagrange, Poisson, (L^p, l^p), etc.) in control theory (93D05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games, Michael Maschler's bibliography, Dynamics of cooperative games, On a dynamic theory for the kernel of an \(n\)-person game, Monotone trajectories of multivalued dynamical systems, Iterative processes with nucleolar restrictions, A note on the convergence of transfer sequences in \(n\)-person games, Dynamic systems of differential inclusions for the bargaining sets

Cites Work

• Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
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