Incentive compatibility and incomplete information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90047-9zbMath0402.90005OpenAlexW2055581183MaRDI QIDQ1255869

John O. Ledyard

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/82586/

zbMATH Keywords

PreferencesVotingSocial ChoiceIncentive CompatibleIncomplete InformationManipulationNondictatorial SchemeTrue Preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality ⋮ The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ On robust constitution design ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ The robustness of robust implementation ⋮ Implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Locally robust implementation and its limits ⋮ Peter J. Hammond ⋮ Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers ⋮ The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

This page was built for publication: Incentive compatibility and incomplete information