A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7zbMath0402.90011OpenAlexW2170219120MaRDI QIDQ1255872

K. Appert

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

zbMATH Keywords

CoreGeneral Equilibrium TheoryEconomies with Public GoodsNoncooperative Games of ExcahangeStrong Equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers ⋮ Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games ⋮ Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ When Is a Semi-honest Secure Multiparty Computation Valuable? ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY ⋮ Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics ⋮ On the theory of cost sharing ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ Every member of the core is as respectful as any other ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation ⋮ Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

Cites Work

• Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
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