A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
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Publication:1255879
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7zbMath0402.90020OpenAlexW1976093702MaRDI QIDQ1255879
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7
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