A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
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Publication:1256383
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90039-XzbMath0403.90004OpenAlexW2035823093MaRDI QIDQ1256383
Richard G. Niemi, Richard D. McKelvey
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90039-x
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