Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
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Publication:1256388
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90087-XzbMath0403.90012OpenAlexW1998089561MaRDI QIDQ1256388
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90087-x
Related Items (31)
Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core ⋮ Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem ⋮ Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods ⋮ Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification? ⋮ Endogenous formation of security exchanges ⋮ A Tiebout theorem ⋮ Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games ⋮ Dynamic club formation with coordination ⋮ Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction ⋮ Second best taxation as a game ⋮ Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects. ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting ⋮ Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods ⋮ Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ On the accessibility of core-extensions ⋮ Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Weakly democratic regular tax equilibria in a local public goods economy with perfect consumer mobility ⋮ Tiebout and sympathy ⋮ Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores ⋮ Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies ⋮ Efficient club formation in a frictional environment ⋮ The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights ⋮ Corrigendum to ``When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods? ⋮ Household formation and markets
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