Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90059-0zbMath0404.90004OpenAlexW1981128832MaRDI QIDQ1256942

Linda Cohen

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/82633/

zbMATH Keywords

VotingCyclingConstrained Plott EquilibriumSimple MajorityTop Cycle Set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control ⋮ A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits ⋮ Chaos, but in voting and apportionments? ⋮ Structural instability of the core ⋮ Pareto optimality in spatial voting models ⋮ Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets ⋮ Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold ⋮ Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections ⋮ The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• A Note on Single Peakedness
• Proof of a Conjecture in Social Choice

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