A dynamical model of political equilibrium
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Publication:1256943
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90011-4zbMath0404.90005OpenAlexW1963777581MaRDI QIDQ1256943
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d03/d0396.pdf
Social Choice TheoryDynamical VotingIndefinite Series of ElectronsPolitical EquilibriumPolitical Process
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Cites Work
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- Abstentions and majority equilibrium
- Some Generalizations of Social Decisions under Majority Rule
- Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- Majority Voting and Social Choice
- Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
