Well-posedness of linear closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for singularly perturbed systems

DOI10.1016/0016-0032(79)90089-9zbMath0408.90096OpenAlexW2044937313WikidataQ127391117 ScholiaQ127391117MaRDI QIDQ1258692

K. Appert

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of the Franklin Institute (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-0032(79)90089-9

zbMATH Keywords

Decision MakingApplication of Mathematical ProgrammingLeader-Follower GameLinear Closed-Loop StrategySingularly Perturbed SystemsStackelberg Games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Linear systems in control theory (93C05) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (4)

Robust Nash strategies for a class of non-linear singularly perturbed problems† ⋮ Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for singularly perturbed systems: the recursive approach ⋮ Team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for systems with slow and fast modest ⋮ Singular perturbations and time-scale methods in control theory: Survey 1976-1983

Cites Work

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• On stochastic dynamic Stackelberg strategies
• Well-posedness of singularly perturbed Nash games
• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• A decomposition of near-optimum regulators for systems with slow and fast modes
• Leader-follower strategies for multilevel systems
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic problems
• The matrix minimum principle
• Stackelburg solution for two-person games with biased information patterns

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