Voluntary auctions for noxious facilities: Incentives to participate and the efficiency of siting decisions

DOI10.1006/jeem.1993.1030zbMath0775.90090OpenAlexW2022812963MaRDI QIDQ1261409

Arthur O'Sullivan

Publication date: 16 September 1993

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1993.1030

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Locating landfills--optimization vs. reality ⋮ Siting noxious facilities: efficiency and majority rule decisions ⋮ Multibidding game under uncertainty ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms ⋮ Choosing and sharing ⋮ Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility

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