Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90123-3zbMath0685.90016OpenAlexW1968174942MaRDI QIDQ1262188

Roy Radner, Peter B. Linhart

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90123-3

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbilateral bargainingsealed-bid mechanismminimax-regret strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (10)

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty ⋮ Market Exit and Minimax Regret ⋮ Context dependence and consistency in dynamic choice under uncertainty: the case of anticipated regret ⋮ Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison ⋮ Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets ⋮ Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching ⋮ Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences ⋮ Robust monopoly pricing ⋮ Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept ⋮ Regret aversion and opportunity dependence

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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