A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(89)90059-0zbMath0685.90017OpenAlexW1966298355MaRDI QIDQ1262189

Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(89)90059-0

zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand equilibriummixed strategy Nash equilibriaprice setting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (6)

Bertrand games and sharing rules ⋮ Pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple retailers: A game-theoretic approach ⋮ A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games ⋮ A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints ⋮ Clock games: theory and experiments ⋮ CONSUMER MISTAKES IN BERTRAND GAMES

Cites Work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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