Bargaining with common values

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90119-1zbMath0686.90045OpenAlexW2072935944MaRDI QIDQ1262825

Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/775.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbargainingdelay to agreementunique perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (14)

Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons ⋮ Bargaining with evolving private information ⋮ Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection ⋮ Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection ⋮ No trade ⋮ Equity bargaining with common value ⋮ Information-based trade ⋮ Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller ⋮ Bridging the gap: bargaining with interdependent values ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection ⋮ Workup ⋮ Optimal delay in committees ⋮ SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY

Cites Work

• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining
• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

This page was built for publication: Bargaining with common values