Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1263539
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90125-7zbMath0687.90101OpenAlexW2158003995MaRDI QIDQ1263539
Joseph Farrell, Robert D. Gibbons
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63303
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Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- A Theory of Credibility
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
