Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form

DOI10.1007/BF01248497zbMath0687.90102MaRDI QIDQ1263541

Joël Moulen, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityacyclicitycorecoalitionsimple gameeffectivity functionvetodomination of subsetsgame in constitutional form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: a revisitation ⋮ Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice ⋮ Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
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