Some new results on least square values for TU games

DOI10.1007/BF02564802zbMath0907.90285OpenAlexW2074461983MaRDI QIDQ1265253

Federico Valenciano, Luis Manuel Sánchez Ruiz, José Manuel Zarzuelo

Publication date: 28 September 1998

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02564802

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityTU gamesvaluevalues for TU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

Individual weighted excess and least square values ⋮ Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value ⋮ Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games ⋮ The least square B-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games ⋮ The family of ideal values for cooperative games ⋮ The least square nucleolus is a normalized Banzhaf value ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamics of cooperative games
• The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
• Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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