Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1996.0018zbMath0909.90109OpenAlexW2016032160MaRDI QIDQ1267632

Alistair Ulph

Publication date: 13 October 1998

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0018

zbMATH Keywords

international tradeenvironmental policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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