Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1996.0016zbMath0907.90087OpenAlexW1964110274MaRDI QIDQ1267703

Gregory S. Amacher, Arun S. Malik

Publication date: 13 October 1998

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0016

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingenvironmental regulationnoncooperative, Stackelberg game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship ⋮ Regulatory attitudes and environmental innovation in a model combining internal and external R\&D

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