Inspection games in arms control

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(95)00261-8zbMath0909.90289OpenAlexW2151086975MaRDI QIDQ1268419

Shmuel Zamir, Bernhard von Stengel, Ruldolf Avenhaus, Morton John Canty, D. Marc Kilgour

Publication date: 24 November 1998

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00261-8

zbMATH Keywords

variable samplinginspection gameattribute samplingarms control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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• Optimal Data Verification Tests
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• [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/wiki/Publication:4770247 Zuverl�ssige Inspektionsstrategien]
• A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
• The inspector's non‐constant‐sum game: Its dependence on a system of detectors

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