Monotone second-best optimal contracts

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(94)00298-3zbMath0922.90043OpenAlexW2065838998MaRDI QIDQ1268454

George E. Monahan, Vijay Vemuri

Publication date: 24 November 1998

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(94)00298-3

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemoptimal payment scheduletwo stage nonlinear programming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Nonlinear programming (90C30) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Incentive mechanism design problem based on gradient dynamics ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach

Cites Work

• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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