Instrument choice when regulators and firms bargain
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Publication:1268485
DOI10.1006/JEEM.1998.1032zbMath0911.90095OpenAlexW2100469552MaRDI QIDQ1268485
Arun S. Malik, Gregory S. Amacher
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1032
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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