International pollution problems: Unilateral initiatives by environmental groups in one country
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Publication:1268512
DOI10.1006/JEEM.1998.1037zbMath0914.90065OpenAlexW2040682122WikidataQ59276918 ScholiaQ59276918MaRDI QIDQ1268512
Publication date: 18 October 1998
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1037
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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Transboundary Pollution Abatement, Emission Permits Trading and Compensation Mechanism: A Differential Game Analysis ⋮ Dynamic decision of transboundary basin pollution under emission permits and pollution abatement ⋮ Dynamic game of international pollution control with general oligopolistic equilibrium: Neary meets Dockner and Long ⋮ Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable? ⋮ A differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading ⋮ Selection of a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium in a class of differential games ⋮ Transboundary Emission Under Stochastic Differential Game ⋮ Pollution control in open economies: implications of within-period interactions for dynamic game equilibrium
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