International fish wars: The strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1998.1038zbMath0910.90100OpenAlexW2008282444MaRDI QIDQ1268514

Gorazd Ruseski

Publication date: 19 April 1999

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1038

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmagovernment policynoncooperative international fishing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (4)

COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ⋮ EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES ⋮ HUMAN FERTILITY DECISIONS AND COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS ⋮ COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH

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