Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2392zbMath0911.90125OpenAlexW1986857581MaRDI QIDQ1268573

Sandro Brusco

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2392

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian equilibriumsequential mechanismsmultiplicity problemauctions with correlated types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction

Cites Work

• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Bayesian Implementation

This page was built for publication: Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types