Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2394zbMath0911.90015OpenAlexW1969976996MaRDI QIDQ1268574

Lu Hong

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2394

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economyendowment conditionfeasible Bayesian implementationfeasible Nash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ The endowment game when \(n = 2\)

Cites Work

• Implementation in differential information economies
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• Nash implementation in production economies
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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