Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
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Publication:1268575
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2388zbMath0911.90012OpenAlexW2064233784MaRDI QIDQ1268575
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273386/files/qed_wp_952.pdf
Related Items
Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
Cites Work
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Implementation in differential information economies
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
