Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
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Publication:1268576
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2387zbMath0911.90365OpenAlexW2055890485MaRDI QIDQ1268576
Michele Piccione, Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G. Binmore
Publication date: 16 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2387
subgame-perfect equilibriummodified evolutionarily stable strategiesRubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game
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