Pollution claim settlements under correlated information

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2374zbMath0911.90016OpenAlexW2072011972MaRDI QIDQ1268595

Martin Pesendorfer

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2374

zbMATH Keywords

implementabilityincentive compatible mechanismsfree-riding problempolluting plant

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Continuity in auction design
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

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