Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2375zbMath0911.90112OpenAlexW1973926382MaRDI QIDQ1268596

Stefan Reichelstein, Thomas Marschak

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2375

zbMATH Keywords

communication costsprice mechanismsnetwork mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Convention evolution in organizations and markets, Economics of leadership and hierarchy, Mathematical models of formation of rational organizational hierarchies, Systems of Bounded Rational Agents with Information-Theoretic Constraints, Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies, A methodology for analyzing decision networks, based on information theory

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