Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2366zbMath0911.90011OpenAlexW2065807051MaRDI QIDQ1268597

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2366

zbMATH Keywords

existencecompatibility conditiontransferable utilityquasi-linear utility functionsBayesian incentivebudget balance correlated typescompatible mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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