Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0600zbMath0911.90355OpenAlexW1990745819MaRDI QIDQ1268631

K. Appert

Publication date: 16 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2700d630bfda95be5271529efb0a1571e06ad979

zbMATH Keywords

effectively rectangular game formssuperdeterminate game form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (3)

Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms ⋮ Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms ⋮ Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: Some possibility results

Cites Work

• A note of tight extensive game forms
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
• Rectangularity and Tightness: A Normal Form Characterization of Perfect Information Extensive Game Forms
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