Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0602zbMath0911.90359OpenAlexW2118259328MaRDI QIDQ1268635

Georg Kirchsteiger, Klaus Ritzberger, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0602

zbMATH Keywords

noisesubgame perfect equilibriumsubgame perfectionimperfect observabilitytwo-stage gamecommitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (11)

DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE ⋮ STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES ⋮ A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES ⋮ Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result ⋮ The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly ⋮ An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs ⋮ Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Moral hazard and private monitoring ⋮ Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader

Cites Work

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• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Commitment and observability in games
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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