The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
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Publication:1268636
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0607zbMath0911.90380OpenAlexW2072264863MaRDI QIDQ1268636
Ennio Stacchetti, David G. Pearce
Publication date: 16 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d08/d0892.pdf
Related Items (13)
Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships ⋮ Discounted quotas ⋮ Even up: maintaining relationships ⋮ The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations ⋮ Partnerships based on joint ownership ⋮ For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment ⋮ Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism ⋮ Endogenous and exogenous commitment ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
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- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
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