On the centipede game
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Publication:1268637
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0605zbMath0911.90354OpenAlexW2020528916MaRDI QIDQ1268637
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b335f97896efc4ece2d5fa01c2281ecdb9464441
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