Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0617zbMath0911.90126OpenAlexW2030560378MaRDI QIDQ1268638

Bhaskar Dutta, Kalyan Chatterjee

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0617

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumthin marketsbargaining procedureseffect of competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price ⋮ Transparency, complementarity and holdout ⋮ Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers. ⋮ Bargaining and network structure: an experiment ⋮ A multilateral telephone bargaining game ⋮ A decentralized market with trading links

Cites Work

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• Bargaining conventions
• Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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