Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
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Publication:1268638
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0617zbMath0911.90126OpenAlexW2030560378MaRDI QIDQ1268638
Bhaskar Dutta, Kalyan Chatterjee
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0617
Related Items (8)
Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price ⋮ Transparency, complementarity and holdout ⋮ Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers. ⋮ Bargaining and network structure: an experiment ⋮ A multilateral telephone bargaining game ⋮ A decentralized market with trading links
Cites Work
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- Bargaining conventions
- Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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