Games with partially enforceable agreements

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0618zbMath0911.90357OpenAlexW2066135424MaRDI QIDQ1268640

Claudio Mezzetti, James W. Friedman

Publication date: 16 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0618

zbMATH Keywords

imperfectly enforceable agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The Bargaining Problem
• Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Unnamed Item

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