On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0628zbMath0911.90128OpenAlexW2078290668MaRDI QIDQ1268642

Robert W. Rosenthal, Maria Angeles de Frutos

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4418

zbMATH Keywords

identical common-valued objectssequenced second-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Auctioning bulk mobile messages ⋮ Information feedback in a dynamic tournament ⋮ Loss aversion in sequential auctions ⋮ Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions ⋮ Limited liability and high bids in English auctions

Cites Work

• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
• The declining price anomaly
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

This page was built for publication: On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions