More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
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Publication:1268645
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0630zbMath0911.90367OpenAlexW2126125699WikidataQ56431825 ScholiaQ56431825MaRDI QIDQ1268645
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fe36e5ff24f51394b5f0dfa5ac322c2e66555810
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