An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0614zbMath0914.90274OpenAlexW2072148344MaRDI QIDQ1268651

Yossi Feinberg

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0614

zbMATH Keywords

cooperation structuresnoncooperative linking game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games ⋮ Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation ⋮ Revenue sharing in semiconductor industry supply chain: cooperative game theoretic approach

Cites Work

• Coalition formation under limited communication
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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