Reciprocity, trust, and payoff privacy in extensive form bargaining

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0638zbMath0910.90268OpenAlexW1977765731MaRDI QIDQ1268653

Kevin A. McCabe, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0638

zbMATH Keywords

two-person extensive form game trees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (3)

Applying ``theory of mind: theory and experiments ⋮ Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity ⋮ How to identify trust and reciprocity.

Cites Work

• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
• Altruism in anonymous dictator games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Reciprocity, trust, and payoff privacy in extensive form bargaining