Naive adaptive behavior and the observability of gambles

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0609zbMath0910.90290OpenAlexW2028211982MaRDI QIDQ1268657

Arthur J. Robson

Publication date: 13 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0609

zbMATH Keywords

biological selectionnaive adaptive learning rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Social and behavioral sciences: general topics (91C99) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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