Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2385zbMath0911.90013OpenAlexW2107165558MaRDI QIDQ1270056

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e1caafb7642c24ce200babedbc5654ea2578dc88

zbMATH Keywords

public decisionnoisy signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Behavioral aspects of implementation theory ⋮ The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand ⋮ Role of honesty in full implementation ⋮ Investment dynamics with common and private values ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Majority rule when voters like to win

Cites Work

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• The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation.
• Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

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