On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2389zbMath0911.90066OpenAlexW2071514477MaRDI QIDQ1270057

Christopher Phelan

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee75c2141a4b7d2307e7a641df26a674c113f26e

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardlong-run consumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (9)

Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment ⋮ From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information ⋮ Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption ⋮ A theory of political and economic cycles ⋮ Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design ⋮ On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information ⋮ EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE ⋮ Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Incentives and Aggregate Shocks
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets

This page was built for publication: On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard