Evolution with changing mutation rates
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Publication:1270059
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2382zbMath0910.90049OpenAlexW2021488458MaRDI QIDQ1270059
Publication date: 2 December 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2382
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Economic growth models (91B62) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items
Evolution, population growth, and history dependence, Imitation, local interaction, and coordination, Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring, Evolutionary Game Theory, An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics, Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations, Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring, Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise, Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
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