The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2381zbMath0911.90064OpenAlexW1488465095MaRDI QIDQ1270062

Holger M. Müller

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2381

zbMATH Keywords

exponential utilitycontinuous-time principal-agent modelfirst-best sharing rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (16)

Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice ⋮ Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model ⋮ Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks ⋮ Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems ⋮ Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation ⋮ Linear quadratic nonzero sum differential games with asymmetric information ⋮ A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem ⋮ A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal ⋮ Optimal contracts in continuous-time models ⋮ Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions ⋮ OPTIMAL MULTI-AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems ⋮ Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences

Cites Work

• On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

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