Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2397zbMath0910.90269OpenAlexW1973030797MaRDI QIDQ1270070

Elchanan Ben-Porath

Publication date: 2 December 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2397

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcorrelated equilibrium distributioncheap pre-play procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (18)

A simple model of secure public communication ⋮ Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations ⋮ Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication ⋮ Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players ⋮ Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ A commitment folk theorem ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol ⋮ Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information ⋮ Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. ⋮ Eliciting information from multiple experts

Cites Work

• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Mediated talk
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

This page was built for publication: Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures