Restricted attention, myoptic play, and the learning of equilibrium

DOI10.1023/A:1018987409039zbMath0910.90281OpenAlexW1587652772MaRDI QIDQ1270625

Sjur Didrik Flåm

Publication date: 3 November 1998

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018987409039

zbMATH Keywords

learningNash equilibriumnoncooperative gamesprojected gradientrepeated playCournot beliefsspatial oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS ⋮ Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing. ⋮ REPEATED PLAY AND NEWTON'S METHOD ⋮ NEWTONIAN MECHANICS AND NASH PLAY

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