Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
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Publication:1270746
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2395zbMath0910.90032OpenAlexW2052886920MaRDI QIDQ1270746
Publication date: 3 November 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/cfa74f3040b07f0658a858e6deb4f4ae32449343
Related Items (11)
On the recursive saddle point method ⋮ On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games ⋮ A strategic dynamic programming method for studying short-memory equilibria of stochastic games with uncountable number of states ⋮ Credible forward guidance ⋮ Optimal monetary policy in a collateralized economy ⋮ Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets ⋮ An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance ⋮ On credible monetary policy and private government information ⋮ Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information ⋮ Introduction to modeling money and studying monetary policy ⋮ Stabilizing properties of monetary feedback rules: A representative-agent approach.
Cites Work
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- Credible public policy
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- Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
- Sustainable monetary policies
- Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- Unnamed Item
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